S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002329
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, MOPS, MCAP, IS
SUBJECT: IDF REGIONAL COMMANDERS SPEAK OUT IN PRESS
INTERVIEWS
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (S) Summary and Comment: Within the span of several
days, the Israeli Defense Force Regional Commanders made
direct and frank comments in separate interviews to the press
regarding the state-of-play in Israel's northern, central,
and southern regions. On the northern border, Maj. Gen. Gadi
Eisenkot described a GOI policy to respond with
indiscriminate force against Lebanon should hostilities
resume. OC Central Command Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni highlighted
increased settler violence and improved Palestinian Authority
security forces in the West Bank. In the south, Maj. Gen.
Yoav Galant suggested Israel could retake the Gaza Strip at
any time -- but with a heavy price. All three regional
commanders argued the Second Lebanon War represented a
"missed opportunity." We believe the release of the three
interviews is a coordinated effort by the IDF to reassure the
Israeli public and make clear its views during a period in
which the GOI is focused on coalition politics. Conspicuous
by its absence is any discussion of military operations
against Iran, the planning for which is being conducted by
Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan. End summary and
comment.
Northern Command: "Dahiya Doctrine"
-----------------------------------
2. (SBU) In his first interview in four years, OC Northern
Command Maj. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot described a tense situation
along the northern Israeli border -- and suggested a crushing
Israeli response should fighting resume. Eisenkot --
perceived by some as a candidate for chief of staff -- is
charged with preventing another "fiasco" following the Second
Lebanon War of 2006. He argued that the Second Lebanon War
was allowed to continue for too long; the next war -- if it
breaks out -- "should be decided quickly and powerfully,
without winking to world public opinion." Eisenkot made
these comments to the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth on
Oct. 3.
3. (SBU) Eisenkot said the probability of another round of
fighting in Lebanon is high, noting the Lebanese side of the
border has changed. He described the 160 Shiite villages
south of the Litani River as "surface-to-surface rocket
villages" -- each Shiite village is run by Hizballah as a
military site with a headquarters, an intelligence center,
and a communications center. Eisenkot said dozens of rockets
are concealed in village homes, basements and attics,
suggesting Hizballah is preparing for a defensive battle in
addition to the capability of firing rockets at Israel.
4. (SBU) Eisenkot said these villages are backed by Iran,
which is investing "hundreds of millions of dollars" there
per year -- including equipment, training, and direct
command. Eisenkot said Israeli forces have observed Iranian
personnel "in the field, approving operational plans." He
added that Israeli intelligence coverage is more significant
and serious -- improved intelligence was one of the most
important lessons learned from 2006.
5. (SBU) Commenting on the Iran-Syria-Hizballah axis,
Eisenkot suggested Syria has "the best of both worlds": it
has repaired its international image, but continues to permit
Hizballah to build its strength. He argued that there is a
"Hizballah-ization" of the Syrian army, which is adopting
tactics learned in 2006. Eisenkot said Syrian armed forces
are increasing stocks of anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft
missiles, thereby enhancing fortifications and defense
capabilities.
6. (S) Eisenkot labeled any Israeli response to resumed
conflict the "Dahiya doctrine" in reference to the leveled
Dahiya quarter in Beirut during the Second Lebanon War in
2006. He said Israel will use disproportionate force upon
any village that fires upon Israel, "causing great damage and
destruction." Eisenkot made very clear: this is not a
recommendation, but an already approved plan -- from the
Israeli perspective, these are "not civilian villages, they
are military bases." Eisenkot in this statement echoed
earlier private statements made by IDF Chief of General Staff
Gabi Ashkenazi, who said the next fight in Southern Lebanon
would come at a much higher cost for both sides -- and that
the IDF would not hold back.
7. (SBU) Eisenkot stated that Damascus fully understands what
the Israelis did in Dahiya, and that the Israelis have the
capability of doing the same to Syria. He suggested the
possibility of harm to the population has been Hizballah
leader Nasrallah's main constraint, and the reason for the
quiet over the past two years. Eisenkot criticized media
coverage of Nasrallah, arguing it legitimizes and equalizes
Nasrallah as an adversary.
Central Command: Leaving the Territories a "Very Big Risk"
--------------------------------------------- -------------
8. (SBU) In a separate interview with Israeli newspaper
Ha'aretz on Oct. 3, OC Central Command Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni
reviewed on-going friction in the West Bank, especially
following the recent stabbing at Yitzhar, the settler rampage
in the nearby Palestinian village of Asira al-Kabiliya,
clashes in Hebron and near the Yad Yair outpost, and a
Palestinian driver plowing into pedestrians in Jerusalem.
Shamni, which Ha'aretz suggests as a possible next chief of
Military Intelligence, praised Palestinian security forces'
efforts in the West Bank. However, he was quick to note that
it will take time for the Palestinian Authority to establish
its counterterrorism capacity.
9. (SBU) Shamni describes "an increase in Jewish violence" in
the West Bank; several hundred people are conspiring against
Palestinians and security forces, he said. Settlers
organized a demonstration outside his home last month
protesting restraining orders he issued against three
right-wing activists. Shamni argues such actions cause
"tremendous damage" to the Israel Defense Force's image and
the State of Israel, and force the IDF to divert its
attention elsewhere, thereby impairing its ability to carry
out missions in the territories. Shamni notes the Israeli
security service Shin Bet is well-aware of these individuals
and the danger they bring, but also acknowledges that "an
extreme incident could happen at any time."
10. (SBU) Shamni praised efforts by the Palestinian security
services, including especially the Jenin Project. According
to the Ha'aretz article, Shamni said United States Security
Coordinator (USSC) Gen. Dayton told him in late July that the
project had not succeeded as the economy had not improved
dramatically. Shamni disagreed, stating that the project has
created a "good basis" in Jenin, and noted improvements such
as working groups, public-works projects, and a hotline
between Israeli and Palestinian forces, and that rather than
terminate it, Shamni pressed for what the IDF is calling
"Jenin 2." Shamni lamented lack of high-quality toops in
the Palestinian security forces, and thelength of training
for these forces in Jordan.
11. (SBU) The Palestinian Authority (PA) has becoe stronger,
Shamni acknowledged. Yet Shamni arged that Hamas has the
capability of recovering quickly -- this requires continued
pressure by boththe Israelis and the PA. While the PA has
been ffective, it has only just begun to build an
alternative to what "Hamas has been doing for years," he
said. Proper PA rule will take time; Israeli withdrawal from
the territories will be a "very big risk," Shamni argued. In
that respect, work on the separation fence has been moving
too slowly; Shamni doubted the fence could be completed
within three years time.
12. (SBU) Shamni offered his own limited thoughts on the
Second Lebanon War, describing it as a "missed opportunity."
He argued that the IDF had the capability and sufficiently
trained units to "do a much better job" than the outcome in
2006. Shamni suggests that the IDF "knowingly skimped on
training," which contributed to its mediocre performance --
but the "qualitative and quantitative difference" between the
IDF and Hizballah should have translated into a "much better
ground operation." He opined that the soldiers or
lower-level commanders were not at fault; rather, the poor
outcome was a result of "the way things were conducted at
higher levels."
Southern Command: Use Our Head, Not Our Gut
-------------------------------------------
13. (C) In his Sept. 29 interview with the Israeli newspaper
Ma'ariv, OC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant analyzed
the Israeli decision to disengage and the subsequent security
ramifications in the Gaza Strip. Galant is mentioned in some
circles as the next deputy chief of staff. Although
beginning poorly, Galant's relationship with Ashkenazi has
gradually improved.
14. (SBU) Galant explained that disengagement from the Gaza
Strip was a "political act." Defending the border with Gaza
has become much easier, but has led to a strengthened Hamas.
Galant said Hamas now has anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft
missiles in Gaza; it is only a matter of time before they
acquire planes and tanks. He estimated Hamas numbers "in the
range of 20,000" fighters, and is organized with a military
commander, and chain of command complete with regional
commanders, sub-regional headquarters, battalions, companies
and smaller units. According to Galant, Hamas is developing
a "doctrine of warfare" -- an important difference between a
terror organization that acts randomly and a military
guerrilla organization capable of learning lessons and
instilling doctrine.
15. (SBU) Nevertheless, Galant argued that the balance of
power remains in Israel's favor -- Hamas is "still a
thousandth of Israel's military might." As such, he suggests
the IDF can do "almost anything it feels like in the Gaza
Strip" -- but at a price. He cautioned that Israel should
"use our head and not our gut" -- and deflected questions of
pre-emptive strikes to higher political levels. Hamas
recognizes Israel's overwhelming military superiority, Galant
argued, which is why Hamas military targets are always
located near schools or residential buildings. Hamas' goal
is not to defeat the Israeli military, but rather to exact a
"moral and international price" and to "enlist Israeli public
opinion" to make the price of conflict with Hamas intolerable.
16. (SBU) On smuggling along the Egyptian border, Galant
noted that the "Egyptians are trying." While its performance
has improved, he argued that Egypt could do more by
preventing the smuggling of weapons into the Sinai, instead
of focusing only upon the border with Gaza. Galant accused
Iran as being responsible for the arms entering Gaza,
including missile prototypes meant for learning on,
disassembling, and self-production.
17. (SBU) Finally, Galant concurred that the Second Lebanon
War represented a missed opportunity to "create an
achievement on a significantly large scale." He suggested
that the "highest levels" of the GOI did not understand how
to employ the Israeli military, nor the actions necessary to
achieve stated goals.
COMMENT
-------
18. (S) The timing of the interviews suggests a
well-coordinated attempt by the IDF and Gen. Ashkenazi to
make their views known to the Israeli public as the GOI
civilian leadership struggles with coalition politics. When
Ashkenazi assumed command of the IDF, he imposed a near media
blackout for his general officers, and has subsequently
limited their contact with the media. Rumors in the IDF
claim that any leaks will be dealt with severely, and IDF
officers have been polygraphed to insure compliance with this
policy.
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